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MARRIAGE IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS*
CHARLES W. TAINTOR, lit
I. G-ERAL PRiNcTnPIs
It must first be recognized that three different types of problems
are raised in this field by what purport to be marriages: problems
concerning the creation of the relationship of man and wife; those
concerning the method whereby the parties signify their consents to
the assumption of the relationship; and those concerning the legal
protection accorded to claims arising therefrom. These involve,
respectively, the status, the ceremony, and the incidents' of marriage.
It has often been said or assumed in the past that the laws of the
domicile or domiciles of the parties at the time of the ceremony govern
the creation of the status, except that it will not be created if the
laws of the state where the ceremony takes place-lex loci cele-
brationis2-refuse to create it; that the lex loci celebrationis governs
the ceremony; and that the laws of the state in which the enjoyment
of an incident is claimed determine whether the claim to it is legally
protected.
There are three possible approaches to the concrete problems: (1)
It would be possible to treat all cases as involving claims to incidents.
(2) It would be possible to determine in vacuo that the status does
or does not exist and to decide that, if it does, all incidents inevitably
flow from it; and that, if not, there is nothing from which incidents
can flow. (3) It would be possible to decide that the status exists,
and to make an independent decision that a claimed incident is or is
not protected. There is no evidence that any court uses the first
approach and it is often difficult to determine which of the others
is being used in a case.
The usual method seems to be that of (2) supra, (3) having been
used only in extreme cases, those involving claims to the incident of
* This article will be devoted almost entirely to re-examination of the con-
clusions which I reached after study of the field about twenty years ago and
to consideration of the cases which have since then been decided. The results
of the aforesaid research and the conclusions will be found in my articles:
Effect of Extra-State Marriage Ceremonies, 10 Mss. L.J. 105 (1938), and
What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of Marriage, 19 B.U.L.
REv. 353 (1939). These articles will, hereinafter, be cited to the review and
page, only.
t Acting Dean, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. Examples are cohabitation, property rights, the production of legitimate
children.
2. The words "ceremony" and "celebratio" do not refer to formal celebra-
tion of a marriage by authorized persons, though many states require it: the
reference is equally to an informal exchange of consents to marriage, usually
called "common-law marriage."
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sexual intercourse between persons who were closely related by
blood, or were of different races, or were parties to a polygamous
union, or those in which the court felt that the law of the state had
been insulted by the extra-state marriage.3 There are, however, a
few cases in which the nature of a claimed incident was probably in-
fluential in causing the decision that the marriage was valid or void.
4
1. Form of Ceremony
One of the usual statements of a rule of the conflict of laws of
marriage is: A marriage which is void under the laws of the lex loci
celebrationis is void.
This statement is, in the main, correct insofar as the requirements
as to the form of exchange of consents are concerned. Since marriage is
a status founded on a civil contract 5-a contract in the sense that
mutual consent is essential-the celebration, the contractual element
thereof, the method of exchanging consents, should normally comply
with the laws of the state in which that exchange takes place.6 In
3. These denied: the normal incident of marriage, turning an infani spouse
into a person of full age; a divorce a mensa et thoro; a divorce a vincuto matri-
monii. These will be discussed, infra, under the heading, "Incidents."
4. In Incuria v. Incuria, 155 Misc. 755, 280 N.Y. Supp. 716 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1935), Campione v. Campione, 201 Misc. 590, 107 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
and In re May's Estate, 280 App. Div. 647, 117 N.Y.S.2d 345 (3d Dep't 1952),
aff'd, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953), an uncle married his niece, or an
aunt, her nephew. In none of them, was the incident, the enjoyment of which
might be shocking to the moral sense of the people of New York, sexual inter-
course, directly involved. In Incuria, however, in which the marriage was
declared void, the court seemed to suspect that at least one reason for the
marriage was to facilitate the immigration of the Italian party. In the others,
in which the marriages were held valid, there was no such reason for the
marriage.
In Lederkremer v. Lederkremer, 173 Misc. 587, 18 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct.
1940), the court assumed that the marriage of a New Yorker in Poland was
not annullable for fraud under the Polish law but applied the law of New
York to annul it for the man's fraud in intending the marriage to serve solely
as the basis for his admissibility to this country as the spouse of a citizen and
intending -never to live with the woman as her '"husband."
In Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948), the court properly
recognized the extra-state, miscegenous marriage of nondomiciliaries where
the wife claimed intestate rights in the husband's immovables in Mississippi as
his "widow." The court indicated, however, that it would have held the
marriage void, if the parties had gone to Mississippi and cohabitated there.
5. It is sometimes said that marriage is a "civil contract." Insofar as this
is true, it applies to the exchange of consents, the method of "contracting"
the status. Insofar as it applies to the status, it is true only in a limited sense:
While the contract to marry is a contract, like any other, the contract of mar-
riage is a contract sui generis: no action for damages lies for breach of the
promises involved, the parties cannot rescind it of their own motion. See S.D.
CoDE § 14.0102 (1939): "The provisions of other portions of this Code in rela-
ion to contracts, and the capacity of persons to enter into them have no ap-
plication to the contract of marriage."
Care must, therefore, be taken to distinguish between the contractual and
the static elements of marriage.
6. The possibility that a man and woman may wish to marry each other in
some place where there is no state-e.g., castaways on some unclaimed island-
or in a place where there are no civilized laws, must be considered. In such
eases, the exchange of consents which is essential to common-law marriage
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most states, licenses are required and the conditions precedent to
the issuance of a license vary among the states. In most states, some
form of ceremony is required. The persons who issue licenses and
the persons authorized to celebrate marriages are, normally, local
people. Minor state or municipal officials usually issue licenses and
they probably do and can properly be required to know and comply
with their own laws, but not to know and comply with those of other
states. Indeed, neither the license-issuing officials, nor the celebrants,
are at all likely to be conscious of the possibility that any other law
might be applicable.
It must be understood, however, that the rule-lex loci celebrationis
governs the form of the ceremony of marriage-is a rule in the field
of choice of law, not of legislative jurisdiction. Since the ultimate
control of the creation of the status of marriage is in some domicile,
there is no reason why that state should not permit persons who
rely on its laws for the creation of the status to employ any method
of exchanging consents which it deems appropriate: 7 the important
matter is the exchange, not the manner thereof.
There is a good analogy in cases concerning the legitimation of il-
legitimate children. The law of the domicile prescribes the nature of
the legitimating act, e.g., marriage to the other natural parent or
recognition of the child and taking it into the parent's family, but
the locus of the act is immaterial.8
The assertion of control of the permissible form of ceremony is
exemplified by the few recent cases in which the domiciliary courts
have refused to recognize the effectiveness of extra-state common-law
marriages, and by dicta in Apt v. Apt.9 The American cases are re-
ported, not approved. Each contains an obvious error,10 or an odd
should be effective, jure gentium. This seems to have been the position of Lord
Merriman, P., in Wolfenden v. Wolfenden, [1946] P. 61. The ceremony was
performed in a mission in China by a minister who was neither episcopally
ordained nor authorized to perform marriages under the Foreign Marriage
Act, 1892, 55 & 56 VICT., c. 23. Lord Merriman said that he could not consider
the law of China as applicable, and upheld the marriage as a common-law
marriage.
7. The Foreign Marriages Acts, 1892 and 1947, 55 & 56 VICT. c. 23 and 10 & 11
GEo. 6, c. 33, have prescribed forms effective for the marriage of subjects out-
side of the realm. See also note 62 infra, for an American view.
8. See Taintor, Legitimation, Legitimacy and Recognition in the Conflict of
Laws, 18 CAN. B. REv. 589, 614-15 (1940).
9. [19473 P. 127. Lord Merriman, P., upholding the validity of a foreign
proxy marriage, adverted to arguments that recognition of such marriages of
subjects might facilitate marriages of minors and those in which the sole pur-
pose was to make it possible for the foreign spouse to enter on the British proxy
giver's passport, and said: "It may well be that the problem should be sub-
divided into categories and the test of public policy be applied, if at all, to
each category separately." Id. at 141.
10. Ray v. Ray, 193 Misc. 131, 83 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1948), involved
a marriage by correspondence, in which the man, while "serving in a foreign
land," executed the contract wherever he was. The court said that all civil
agreements made by a soldier would ordinarily be deemed to be made at his
19561
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construction of a statute."
While a state can deny validity to foreign forms of marriages of
those who depend on it for the creation of the status, the courts should
not infer such a denial, but should wait for an express statutory pro-
vision which would, itself, be unwise.
2. Status
The standard statement-a marriage which is void under the lex
loci celebrationis is void-is correct on authority,1 2 though erroneous
on principle. Cheshire says: "Obviously no system of law can allow
the use of its procedure for the contracting of unions which it con-
siders to be void owing to nonage, incest, or for any other reason. 13
This seems to me to overglorify the doctrine, locus r'egit actum, and
to fail to take into account the very minor nature of the interest of
the locus celebrationis in the existence of the status. It seems clear
that that state is little affected by marriages of persons who intend to
leave the state promptly, and to live elsewhere as man and wife:
what interest it has is in the form of celebration, not in the existence of
the status. The highest court of New Hampshire14 and a Surrogate's
domicile, the only state where, on the assumed facts, they could not have
been made; and, apparently as a second ground for the decision, indulged in
the presumption that "the law" of a foreign state would be presumed to be the
same as that of the forum. As to the propriety of this presumption, see Cosulich
Societa Triestina Di Navigazione v. Elting, 66 F.2d 534, 536 (2d Cir. 1933).
11. The decision in In re Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 192, 170 P.2d 183 (1946),
was based on the conclusion that an extra-state common-law marriage was
ineffective because it was not "solemnized," the legislature having enacted:
"The following marriages are prohibited and declared void: ... (3) When not
solemnized by an authorized person. . .," and "Marriages solemnized in any
other country, state or territory, if valid where solemnized, are valid here."
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-2, 40-1-4 (1953). Wade, J., in dissent said that the
word "solemnized" did not necessarily refer to formal ceremonies, only.
The statutes of other states, of the same general import as Utah's § 30-1-4,
use the word "contracted," "celebrated," or "solemnized." No other case holds
that the word used is material, but, rather, that this sort of statute merely
enacts the general rule of the conflict of laws. The judgment of the Ap-
pellate Division in Shea v. Shea, 268 App. Div. 677, 52 N.Y.S.2d 756 (2d Dep't
1945) which relied on the word "solemnized" in the statute (N.Y. DoM. REL.
§11) was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 294 N.Y. 909, 63 N.E.2d 113 (1945)
on the dissenting opinion of Johnston, J., below. He said that this matter was
not like incest and polygamy and that such a marriage is valid, even "where
both parties domiciled in this State, leave it for the purpose of evading its
laws... and then immediately return to this State. . ." 52 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
In In re Van Schaick's Estate, 256 Wis. 214, 40 N.W.2d 588 (1949), the court
applied the first section of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act to invalidate
an extra-state common-law marriage. The courts of Illinois and Massa-
chusetts have recently upheld the validity of such marriages, though each
has enacted the Uniform Act. Pierce v. Pierce, 379 Ill. 185, 39 N.E.2d 990
(1942); Boltz v. Boltz, 325 Mass. 726, 92 N.E.2d 365 (1950).
12. The notion may be that a state will not permit the use of the ceremonial
part of its law of marriage to contract unions which be void for a vice of
substance, if attempted by its own people in the state: there may be an idea
that the locus celebrationis is insulted by such efforts of persons foreign to it.
13. CHEsHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 301 (4th ed. 1952) (hereinafter
cited as CHEsHI).
14. See Sirois v. Sirois, 94 N.I. 215, 50 A.2d 88 (1946) (Marble, J., quoting
19 B.U.L. REv. at 367).
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court of New York 5 have recognized the erroneous nature of the
standard rule.
The standard statement-a marriage which is valid under the lex
loci celebrationis is valid, unless contrary to some strong public policy
of the domicile or domiciles of the parties-is correct, at most, with
respect to only a few cases, those in which the parties have, at the
time of the ceremony, no intention to live as man and wife in any
particular state.
The situations in which states refuse to create the status on extra-
state ceremonies involve fraud, duress, polygamy, miscegenation, in-
sanity, incest, remarriage too soon after divorce, and nonage. It seems
clear that the public policy which dictates the refusal to create the
status is based on the interest of a state to protect itself against odious
marriages (polygamy, "progressive polygamy" through remarriage
too soon after divorce, incest, miscegenation), from those which are
feared to be the source of children who will be undesirable future
citizens (incest, miscegenation, insanity), from those which are less
likely than usual to be peaceful, prosperous and lasting (fraud, duress,
insanity, nonage).16
Therefore, the state whose laws should be looked to in order to dis-
cover a public policy strong enough to require a declaration that a
particular marriage is void for a vice of substance is that in which
the parties will live as man and wife-the intended family domicile.'
7
No domicile at the time of the ceremony has, as such, a sufficiently
15. See In re Palmer's Estate, 192 Misc. 388, 79 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (Surr. Ct.
1948), wherein Witmer, S., said with respect to the remarriage in Pennsylvania
of the guilty party in a New York divorce who was forbidden to remarry by
a New York statute: "Apparently no court in Pennsylvania has had occasion
,to pass upon this point. That is only natural since the parties to such a mar-
riage are only in Pennsylvania long enough to be married .... This fact...
emphasizes that ... the domestic policy of the State of Pennsylvania is not
an important factor." The conflict of laws rule of New York was applied to
hold the marriage valid.
This case is to be compared with Wagner v. Wagner, 58 Mont. Co. L. Rep. 18
(Pa. C.P. 1941), wherein the court erroneously identified the Pennsylvania
policy, forbidding remarriage between the libellee in a divorce for adultery
and the paramour, with that of New York forbidding the remarriage, for a
time, of the guilty party in such a divorce. This resulted in giving to New York
a protection which it does not want: its prohibition of remarriage is given
no extra-territorial effect in its courts.
16. Problems of marriages of infants and insane persons and those induced
by a fraud or duress might call for the application of the law of the domicile
of the de cujus at the time of the ceremony, on the theory that that state best
knows when a child reaches years of sufficient discretion for marriage, whether
a person lacks the mentality to comprehend the nature of marriage, which
persons are sufficiently astute to recognize the fraud, and which are suf-
ficiently courageous to resist the duress. In no case have these possible con-
siderations been discussed. See the discussion, infra, under the appropriate
heading.
17. Cheshire speaks of the "matrimonial domicile" and of the "intended
family home." CHESnHs 291, 297. -
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strong interest to justify the application of its laws to determine
whether or not the parties are of such qualities, or in such relation-
ship, that their marriage should be declared void, nor to determine
that their marriage should be declared valid if the status is one which
offends a strong public policy of the intended family domicile.
There is support for this doctrine in the juristic writings. Speaking
of the doctrine which requires that a marriage be held to be void
if it is void under the marriage law of the domicile of either party,
Cheshire says:
A rule of choice of law, such as that imposed by the dual domicil doc-
trine commands little respect if it is framed without regard to its impact
upon the social life of the community which will be most intimately
affected by its operation.' 8
Beale says:
If the purpose of the law in securing the domestic relations is successful,
it will in fact result in a home and domicil in some particular state. The
state chiefly interested in the maintenance of the domestic relations is this
state of domicil in which the home is to be established and the-relations
exercised.19
It may be objected that there is no present contact between the
parties to a purported marriage and the intended family domicile, and
that some present contact is necessary as a foundation for jurisdiction.
One answer may be that, in cases of ordinary contracts, the conflict of
laws rules of some states point to the law of the place of performance
or to the "proper" law, and the only present contact between the
transaction, or the parties, and that state may be in their minds. An-
other and better answer is that the asserted jurisdiction of the actual
domiciles is founded on a legal concept and not necessarily on a close
factual contact between persons and a state: one may have a domicile,
though he has no present home, no present close contact with a state.
His connection with his domicile, then, may be much more tenuous
18. Id. at 297. He speaks even more strongly on the subject: "If, however,
'the law of the domicil' means, as in practice it is in this context taken to mean,
the internal law of the country concerned, the application of the dual domi-
cile doctrine may produce a result that is calculated to shock the conscience
of all save the most obstinate doctrinaires." Id. at 295.
19. BEALE, CONFLICT or LAWS § 120.15 (1935). See also Coox, LOGICAL AND
LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 447-51 (1949).
Beale, op. cit. supra, and in Beale et al., Marriage and the Domicil, 44 HARV.
L. REv. 501 (1931), and GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115 at 348-49 (3d ed.
1949), have expressed the opinion that the domicile of each party at the time
of the ceremony controls the creation of the status, in the sense that if either
state refuses to create the status upon an extra-state ceremony, the marriage
is void. Their arguments are that each such state has an interest in the status
of its domiciliaries. This is undoubtedly true; but it seems that these interests
are minor when compared to that of the intended family domicile.
The most that happens to either of the domiciles is that it loses a domiciliary,
while the intended family domicile will gain domiciliaries and, most important,
%will gain or refuse to accept a new family unit, the relationship of the parties
to which is of paramount importance to the state.
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than that with the state in which he intends to make his home.
Those who insist that there must be a present connection between
the parties and the state which is relied on for the creation of the
status, may treat the intended family domicile rule as one which
operates in the field of choice of law, a rule which is adopted by states
because it produces better social results than the dual domicile rule.
The indubitable urge to support marriages founded on extra-state
ceremonies unless they violently conflict with some public policy, is
not forwarded by that rule.
Problems may arise in cases in which it is impossible to produce
any direct evidence of an intention to establish a family home in a
particular state. Such cases might seem to call for the application
of the dual domicile rule. Even in such cases, this is wrong. The
factual probability that the parties will make their home in the state
of the man's domicile at the time of the ceremony is great enough to
justify and to call for a decision that the marriage is valid, unless
contrary to some strong public policy of that state.
There is some indication that courts are prepared to apply the
intended family domicile rule. In Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry.,20 the court applied the law of Illinois, the domicile of the parties
to which they intended to return 'and did return a few days after an
extra-state ceremony, but seemed prepared to look to the law of
Minnesota if it had been shown that they intended to live in that
state.21 Apt v. Apt2 2 expressly held effective the proxy of an English
domiciliary where the intended family domicile was the state in which
the proxy acted, but indicated that the result might have been different
if that domicile had been England.
This much is clear: no American court has applied its state's law
of marriage to declare an extra-state ceremony ineffective, where the
party did not intend to and did not return to live in the state.
Most of the statutes either enact the orthodox rule-marriages valid
where contracted are valid here2--or enact the substance of the first
section of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act-persons who reside
and intend to reside in the state do not effectively marry out of it if
their marriages are declared void by its laws.24 In Arizona and
Georgia, the statutes apply to .marriages of all persons who intend
to reside in the state.
My suggestion is that the limited statutes do not represent denial
of more extensive jurisdiction to control the creation of the status,
20. 170 Minn. 317, 213 N.W. 32, 34 (1927); it was there said: 'There is evi-
dence that they intended moving later to Minnesota, but it is indefinite, and
their removal was entirely contingent."
21. Other cases are cited in 19 B.U.L. Rav. 372-74.





but, rather, legislative failure to extend that jurisdiction as far as is
permissible and would be desirable in cases of extremely odious
marriages.2 If a man and woman, one white and the other Negro,
being both domiciled in Virginia26 or in Oklahoma,27 leave their domi-
cies for a marriage ceremony in one of the northeastern states, in-
.tending to return and live in the state of their domicile, their marriage
is void. Surely, if these persons leave one of these states for such a
ceremony, intending to go to live in the other, the public policy of the
latter, the intended family domicile, is as much offended as if they were
returning to it. Moreover, this policy is equally offended no matter
where the parties are domiciled at the time of the ceremony.
The general policy of upholding marriages requires, however, that
states be chary of declaring void any extra-state marriage which is not
offensive to some very strong public policy, and there may well be
situations in which the prompt return of domiciiaries after such a
marriage is more offensive than the moving into the state of persons
who, before the ceremony, were domiciled in another state.28
3. Incidents
The state which is most vitally, indeed that which is alone, interested
in the incidents of marriage, qua ihcidents, is that in which the en-
joyment thereof is claimed. It seems clear that state A cannot permit
enjoyment, within its boundaries, of an incident attaching to the status
under the law of state B which created it, if enjoyment of the same
incident is not permitted by A to persons who marry under its own
laws. If polygamy is permissible in B, but not in A, a man married
25. The opinion in Montgomery v. Gable, 61 Ga. App. 859, 7 S.E.2d 426
(1940), seems to contain an error. The court said: "The first sentence in Code
§ 53-214, 'all marriages solemnized in another State by parties intending at the
time to reside in this State...' can have no extra-territorial application to a
citizen of another State who in good faith contracts marriage in that State with
a resident of Georgia who is laboring under the disability of not being allowed
to marry again in Georgia."
If this had been a construction of legislative intent, it might make sense-
on the groud that unilateral prohibitions of the remarriage of the libellee in a
'divorce do not express a strong public policy, and that the legislature did not
intend, by the enactment of a general "evasion" statute, to state such a policy.
But the words "can have no extra-territorial application" are too strong; and
attribute to the legislature an intention to enact an inoperative statute. The
second sentence of the above section of the Code covers marriages of persons
who leave Georgia to evade its marriage laws with the intention to return.
26. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
27. Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944); Baker v. Carter,
180 Okla. 71, 68 P.2d 85 (1937).
28. For example, it may be that the neighbors of a person who is divorced
in Pennsylvania for adultery would be shocked by the spectacle of that person
living in the state with the paramour, for adultery with whom he was divorced,
but not shocked by a similar cohabitation of the same two persons if they were
strangers who had had no prior contact with the community. Such domiciliaries,
who leave the state for the ceremony and intend to and do return to live in
the state, do not succeed in getting married. In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625,
39 Atl. 16 (1898).
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under the laws of B cannot be permitted to marry again in A. If polyg-
amy is permissible in B, a man cannot be permitted to live with all of
his wives in A. If a man lawfully marries his sister under the laws of B,
he cannot be permitted the incident of sexual intercourse with her
inA.
I have found only one American case, decided since the publication
of my earlier article,29 which involves the simple denial of an incident
to a foreign marriage which was recognized as valid. Recent cases in
England do involve such denials: they are cases of polygamous mar-
riages which were valid under the law governing their validity.
In the American case,3° the man married a woman in India in a po-
tentially polygamous marriage. He- went to New York, became a
Christian and, apparently believing that the orthodox statement that
a marriage which is contrary to the law of nature as generally recog-
nized in Christian countries will not be recognized as marriage in such
a country, really expressed the law of New York, applied for a license
to marry another woman. The court held that he was properly denied
the license. In the English cases, the facts with respect to the mar-
riage were the same: the judgments in the trial court and in the
Court of Appeal were for a decree of nullity of a second marriage in
England3' and an affirmance of such a decree.32
It must be recognized, however, that denial of a normal incident
to a valid marriage is a harsh measure. For that reason, no incident
should be denied unless its enjoyment in the state where that enjoy-
ment is claimed violently offends the moral sense of the community.
Sexual intercourse between two persons, whether married or not, if
they are of different races33 or too closely related by blood,34 may so of-
fend the moral sense of the people of a state and may, therefore, prop-
erly be denied. It seems, however, that this can hardly be true of
emancipation from tutelage, administration of the decedent estate of
the spouse, intestate succession to such an estate as a surviving spouse,
29. 19 B.U.L. REV. 353. In Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir.
1944), the court held that an extra-state ceremony was not effective, where
the union was miscegenous, to work a revocation of the woman's will by a
marriage which was not a marriage. The court said: "But in respect of the
acquisition of property in Oklahoma by descent and distribution, persons
domiciled in that state, ... cannot elude the laws of the state by going into
another state and being married there . . ." (Id. at 123) (Emphasis added).
In Miller v. Lucks, 203 Mliss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948), the court showed
itself willing to declare that a valid foreign miscegenous marriage was void,
if enjoyment of the incident of sexual intercourse was claimed in the state.
30. Application of Sood, 142 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
31. Srini Vasan v. Srini Vasan, [1946] P. 67.
32. Baindail v. Baindail, [1946] P. 122 (C.A.).
33. Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602, No. 7, 825 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879); State
v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872). See State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 249 (1877), and
Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d. 140 (1948).
34. State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N.E. 747 (1890).
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annulment of the marriage, or divorce from it.35
Modern judicial recognition of this principle is found in English,
Canadian and American cases. In Srini Vasan v. Srini Vasan,38 Barn-
ard, J., quoted with approval language of Lord Maugham to the effect
that Hindu polygamous marriages would "properly be treated as valid
in this country for all purposes, except it may be the inheritance of
real estate before the Law of Property Act, 1925,... and some other
exceptional cases. '37 In Lee Sheck Yew v. Attorney General,38 the court
held that the two wives of a Chinese, were entitled to the widows'
exemption from death duties under the law of British Columbia, he
having died while temporarily resident there and testate as to mov-
ables there. McDonald, C.J.A., said: 3 9 "It is no crime in this country
for a domiciled Chinese subject to marry two wives in China. We
are not asked to enforce a contract repugnant to our policy but merely
to recognize a status created by foreign law."
40
A difficult problem might have arisen if the husband had become
domiciled in British Columbia, or had owned immovables there. What
shares would the widows have taken, particularly if there were chil-
dren as well? The problem seems, however, not impossible of solu-
tion: treat all the widows as one widow and distribute the widow's
share equally among them.41
In Miller v. Lucks,42 a case of foreign miscegenous marriage, the
court of Mississippi permitted the husband to take immovables in that
state as a surviving husband. Sidney Smith, C.J., speaking of the
statutes concerning miscegenations, said that they were intended to
prevent white and Negro from living in the state as husband and wife
and: "Where, as here, this did not occur, to permit one of the parties
to ... inherit property in this state from the other does no violence
to the purpose [thereof]."
43
35. On the cases which denied these incidents as well as the older cases
denying sexual intercourse, see 19 B.U.L. REv. 357-66.
36. See [1946] P. 67, 69. The quotation is from Sinha Peerage Claim, 171
H. LoRDs J. 350 (1939).
37. The reference may be to the English court's refusal to decree divorce
from a polygamous marriage. Hyde v. Hyde, L.R. 1 P. & D. 130 (1866).
38. [1924] 1 W.W.R. 753, 756 (Brit. Col. Ct. App. 1923).
39. [1924] 1 W.W.R. at 756.
40. Compare Seedat's Ex'r v. The Master, (Natal), [1917] App. Div. 302 (So.
Air. Sup. Ct.), wherein the sole surviving wife-the plural marriage having
been valid and the husband and one wife having changed domicile to South
Africa after the death of the other wife-was charged death duties at the
rate applicable to strangers, while their children were charged at the rate
applicable to "children."
41. This was the solution of the California Court of Appeal in In re Dalip
Singh Bir's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948).
42. 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948).
43. Id., 36 So. 2d at 142.
[ VOL. 9
MARRIAGE IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
I. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS
1. Form of Ceremony
The technique of British judges-to divide the problems into those
of "form" and "essence" and then to assign a given question, e.g.,
consent of parents, to one or the other, apparently more or less in
vacuo-puts the cart before the horse.4 The technique of Lord Merri-
man, P., in Apt v. Apt,45 is another matter. His technique, as I see it,
was to inquire whether a given type of marriage, by proxy, is "posi-
tively prohibited" by the law of England or not. If it is, it falls into
the category, "essence"; if not, it is in the category, "form." This looks
at first things first, and the words are used merely as convenient tags
to express the result. The discussion herein will be solely of the form
of ceremony, the methods used by the parties to signify their consents
to becoming married.
The matters which are considered by the courts as involving re-
quirements as to the form of ceremony of marriage include: the
necessity of a formal ceremony, the identity of the persons authorized
to perform such ceremonies, the necessity of a license, the conditions
precedent to the issuance of a license, marriage by proxy, the ex-
change of promises of marriage without a formal ceremony whether
face to face or by correspondence. Questions concerning these matters
are, except in rare cases, held to be for the law of the state in which
the exchange of consents takes place.
Almost all of the recent cases6 have been concerned with proxy
marriages and common-law marriages and almost all of them have
held the ceremony effective,47 if such marriages were in proper form
under the lex loci celebrationis.48 Holding these extra-state forms ef-
44. See, e.g., the treatment of the requirement of consent of parents in
Stewart v. Stewart, 56 ONT. L.R. 57 (1924), [1925] D.L.R. 1, and the critical
annotation thereto, [1925] D.L.R. at 6-7.
45. [1947] P. 127.
46. In Boysen v. Boysen, 301 Il. App. 573, 23 N.E.2d 231 (1939), the Illinois
statute, ILL. A N. STAT. C. 89, §§ 6a, 19 (Smith-Hurd 1956), required premarital
examination for veneral disease as a condition precedent to the issuance of a
license to marry: the extra-state ceremony was effective.
In In re Kinkead's Estate, 239 Minn. 27, 57 N.W.2d 628 (1953), under the
lex loci celebrationis, a false affidavit was not a ground for nullity of marriage
where the license was issued in reliance thereon: the ceremony was effective.
In Rynn v. Rynn, 63 Pa. D. & C. 143 (C.P. 1948), the marriage was valid;
although the lex loci celebrationis did not permit marriages to be performed
by a justice of the peace, it did not make such marriages void.
In In re Campbell's Estate, 260 Wis. 625, 51 N.W.2d 709 (1952), the parties
left Wisconsin for the purpose of evading its requirement of a premarital
examination for venereal disease as a condition precedent to the issuance
of a license to marry. Moreover, Wisconsin required two witnesses to a mar-
vriage and the locus celebrationis did not. Neither the intention to evade, nor
the absence of witnesses, made the varriage void.
47. See notes 10, 11 supra.
48. In Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d 250 (1951), it was held that
no effect could be given to an attempted common-law marriage in England
where the institution does not exist.
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fective is correct. It accords with the idea that where persons believe
themselves to be married, they should be held to be married, unless
their union is very offensive to the law of the intended family domicile.
This policy is well put by Taylor, C.J., in Madewell v. United States:49
"The public policy of Tennessee and, this Court believes, the public
policy of the civilized world, is to sustain marriages, not to upset
them.
Several recent cases have considered the validity of proxy marriages,
all but one holding that form of ceremony effective. In the earlier
leading case of Ex parte Suzanna,50 Lowell, J., expressed the opinion
that such a ceremony was effective only if permitted by the law of
the domicile of the proxy-giver, as well as that of the state in which
the proxy acted. The validity of this doctrine was denied by Morton,
J., sitting two years later in the same district.51 His opinion was that
Massachusetts, though common-law marriage was not there valid,
"does not forbid an alien resident here from marrying by proxy in a
manner valid according to the laws of his country." He indicated,
moreover, that, even if Massachusetts should refuse to recognize the
validity of proxy marriages, its refusal would be immaterial under
the circumstances there involved. The woman sought admission to
this country as the "wife" of the man. He said: "Questions of this
character are essentially federal, and ought, if possible, to be decided
on principles of law uniformly applicable throughout the country. '52
In the recent cases, no emphasis on the laws of the domicile of either
party appears, and the solution of the problem is found in the content
of the lex loci celebrationis.53 One case holds the form ineffective
In Miko Jung v. Novaya, 47 N.Y.S.2d 48 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944), it was held
that the marriage of two Japanese in the Japanese consulate in New York
under the forms of Japanese law was not a valid marriage. The court's
position was that Japan has no extra-territorial rights in this country and
could not impose its marriage forms on New York as proper ceremonial
forms. This result seems wrong, if the Japanese law makes such marriages
valid for its own people abroad. If Japan would recognize this as a validmarriage, the reverence of New York for its own forms should not block its
validity.
49. See 84 F. Supp. 329, 332 (E.D. Tenn. 1949).
50. See 295 Fed. 713, 717 (D. Mass. 1924).
51. See Kane v. Johnson, 13 F.2d 432 (D. Mass. 1926).
52. Ibid. It may be that this approach was adopted in Silva v. Tillinghast,
36 F.2d 801 (D. Mass. 1929), in which the foreign proxy marriage was re-
garded as undoubtedly valid: no mention was made of the identity of the
domicile of the American party. In Cosulich Societa Triestina Di Navigazione
v. Elting, 66 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1933), it was assumed that a proxy marriage
was effective if it was valid under the lex loci celebrationis.
53. No mention of the identity of the domicile of either party was made in
United States v. Layton, 68 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Fla. 1946), Fernandes v.
Fernandes, 275 App. Div. 777, 87 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d Dep't 1949), Ferraro v.
Ferraro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948) (highly probable that the
parties were domiciled in New York, which does not permit common-law
marriages within its borders).
In Globus' Petition, 60 Pa. D. & C. 55 (C.P. 1947), the opinion of Lowell, J,,
in the Suzanna case, supra note 50, was quoted, but the court also said: "The
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under that law;54 the others hold it valid.55 The courts have had a
little difficulty in deciding whether such a marriage is a formally cele-
brated or a common-law marriage. It has been said to be valid under
the law of the District of Columbia both as a "common law marriage
and a marriage by proxy,"56 and invalid as a common-law marriage
but valid as a ceremonial marriage under that law.57 It has been said
that such a marriage is regarded as a valid ceremonial one in Nevada
and as a common-law marriage in other states.u Of course, those proxy
marriages wherein the proxy acts in a civil law state are ceremonial
marriages under its law.5 9
The few cases concerning marriage by correspondence hold60 or
assume6' that they are valid if valid under the law of the place where
an ordinary contract would be made by mail-normally the state in
which the instrument containing the second party's signification of
consent is put in the mail. There is no good reason why any state
which recognizes the validity of marriages within its boundaries by
an exchange of consents without cohabitation should object to mar-
riage by correspondence contracted therein, nor should the genuine-
ness of the intention to become married be doubted: the writing is
much better evidence than is parol evidence of the exchange of oral
consents.62
general rule is that a marriage valid where contracted is valid everywhere
[unless repugnant to the public policy of the domicile]." 60 Pa. D. & C. at
57. This was the approach in Apt v. Apt, 176 T.L.R. 359 (P.D.A. 1947).
54. Respole v. Respole, 70 N.E.2d 465 (Ohio C.P. 1946). The court was of
the opinion that nature of the marriage ceremony requires the presence of
both parties. With respect to this error, see the expressly contrary opinion in
the Ferraro and Layton cases, supra note 53, and Lorenzen, Proxy Marriage
and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HARv. L. Ray. 473, 475 (1919); and consider
the cases of marriage by correspondence, notes 60-62 infra.
55. Cases cited notes 50-53 supra.
56. See Fernandes v. Fernandes, 275 App. Div. 777, 87 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d)
Dep't 1949).
57. Validity as a common-law marriage was denied on the ground that the
District requires cohabitation in such cases and there was none. See Ferraro
v. Ferraro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948).
58. See Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92, 97 (9th Cir. 1951).
59. See Kane v. Johnson, 13 F.2d 432 (D. Mass. 1926): "Moreover, the
marriage here in question was formally entered into before a public official."
60. Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (8th Cir. 1918); Common-
wealth v. Amann, 58 Pa. D. & C. 699 (Q.S. 1947). In this case, the court met
the argument that, since the man wrote at another time his words could not
be considered verba de presenti, by characterizing them as containing a con-.
tinuing offer.
61. Ray v. Ray, 193 Misc. 13-1, 83 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1948). This is an
astounding case: the judgment purported to bastardize the child of the
union "as between the parties, but expressly not affecting the child who is
absent from the action." See also the odd technique used by the court to
identify the lex loci celebrationis, note 10 supra.
62. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HAV. L. REV.
473, 488 n.62 (1919), reports that the Judge Advocate General rendered an
opinion, as the article was going to press, that such marriages were valid,
Manton, J., in United States ex rel. Aznar v. Commissioner of Immigration,
298 Fed. 103, 105 (S.D. N.Y. 1924), reports the same opinion and adds that :it
1956]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The recent cases of marriages in the traditional common-law forms-
by exchanges of consents or by such exchanges followed by cohabita-
tion63-have, except for the few aberrant cases reported, supra,4 ex-
amined only the lex loci celebrationis to discover whether or not the
form was effective.65 It is not entirely clear whether the courts think
that they must give full faith and credit to that law, or whether this
should be done through comity,66 or for some other reason. It seems
clear that full faith and credit is not required and that the rule does
not rest on comity, but that it is simply a rule of the conflict of laws.
67
The modern problems have been: whether the parties must be domi-
ciled or resident in the state in which they hold themselves out as
man and wife; whether some less permanent, or even casual, contact
with that state will do; and whether cohabitation in another state,
which does not permit common-law marriage, can be considered as
corroboratory of the asserted exchange of consents.
There seems to be no valid reason why an exchange of promises in
a state which permits this type of common-law marriage should not
further states "that this method might properly be facilitated by the military
authorities in France."
63. In Ferraro v. Ferraro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948), the
court was of the opinion that a proxy marriage in the District of Columbia
could not be supported as a common-law marriage there because the District
requires cohabitation as well as an exchange of consents.
64. See note 10 supra. State ex rel. Superior Court, 23 Wash. 2d 357, 161
P.2d 199 (1945), may be a case of control of the form of ceremony by the
domicile to which the parties intend to return. It was held that Washington
domiciliaries, who live there in a meretricious relationship, cannot establish
a common-law marriage by merely holding themselves out as man and wife
in another state in which they temporarily sojourn. (The only case cited
for the presumption of continuation of the meretricious relationship was a
Washington case.) Semble, however, that if there had been evidence of new
promises made in that state of temporary sojourn, the marriage would have
been held valid.
65. Gradias v. Gradias, 74 P.2d 53 (Ariz. 1937); Pierce v. Pierce, 379 Ill.
185, 39 N.E.2d 990 (1942); Abbott v. Industrial Comm'n, 80 Ohio App. 7, 74
N.E.2d 625 (1946); Wagner v. Wagner, 152 Pa. Super. 4, 30 A.2d 659 (1943);
and cases cited, notes 66-73 infra.
66. In Osburn v. Graves, 210 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1948), the court was of the
opinion that the effectiveness of the ceremony was entitled to full faith and
'credit, but it was thought to be a matter of comity in Shea v. Shea, 268 App.
Div. 677, 52 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (2d Dep't 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 294
N.Y. 909, 63 N.E.2d 113 (1945), on the dissenting opinion of Johnston, J.
67. The opinion of Johnston, J., in the Shea case, supra note 66, contains no
mention of either comity or full faith and credit, his talk being about the con-
flict of laws rules of New York. Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92 (9th Cir.
1951), a case of proxy marriage, also makes it clear that only choice of law is
involved. It was held that where the validity of a marriage, under 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.49 (a) (1949), was to be determined "according to the laws of the place
where the parties resided . . .," the whole law of the place of residence was to
be consulted, including its conflict of laws rules.
In In re Pierce's state, 310 Ill. App. 481, 34 N.E.2d 564 (1941), it was held
that the common-law marriage of Illinois domiciliaries in Nevada was in-
effective. Huffman, J., said: "Such a situation would fail to show any govern-
mental interest that was superior to that of the sister state. Therefore, we
shall consider the sanction of common-law marriages by Nevada to be in-
tended to apply only to its own citizens." Id., 34 N.E.2d at 566.
[ VOL. 9
MARRIAGE IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
be wholly effective as a form of ceremony and, if the evidence of such
an exchange is sufficiently clear, casual presence in the state at the
time of that exchange should be enough. The courts have had no
difficulty with this situation.68
Where, however, cohabitation and repute are needed, either as cor-
roboration of the assertion of the exchange or as the basis for an
inference that there was such an exchange, the courts have not been
unanimous. Where the cohabitation and repute were in the state of
the parties' domicile, the marriages have been valid.69 Where the law
of a state requires both express exchange of consents and cohabitation
as man and wife, if the cohabitation is an essential part of the form
both the exchange and the cohabitation must be in a state which recog-
nizes the validity of common-law marriages.7° On the other hand, if
the cohabitation and repute is merely corroboratory of the exchange
of consents there appears to be no valid reason why the locus of the
former should be material, it is merely evidentiary.7' Where the
cohabitation and repute is the sole foundation for a conclusion that
the parties did actually consent to marriage, the holding out must occur
in a state which recognizes such consent, without an exchange of ex-
press consents, as a sufficient form. 2 The fact that it is difficult to
determine whether the holding out constitutes the common-law mar-
riage or is evidentiary of an express exchange of consents may ac-
count for the cases in which it has been held that a quite casual
contact with a state was sufficient.73
68. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 275 Ky. 559, 122 S.W.2d 137 (1938); Shea v. Shea, 294
N.Y. 909, 63 N.E.2d 113 (1945). In re Foster, 287 P.2d 282 (Idaho 1955)
(semble). In Tetterton v. Arctic Tankers, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 429, (E.D. Pa. 1953),
the court considered the law of Virginia where the parties "visited his rela-
tives," but found no marriage under that law. In State ex rel. Smith v. Superior
Court, 23 Wash. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945), the court found no evidence of
new promises in the state where the parties "temporarily sojourned."
In In re McKanna's Estate, 234 P.2d 673 (Cal. App. 1951), it was said that,
where the relationship was meretricious in its inception in another state, Texas
requires new promises made therein, unless the parties become domiciled in
Texas, in which case consent to a new marriage will be inferred from the
original intent to marry coupled with cohabitation and holding out in Texas.
69. In re McKanna's Estate, 234 P.2d 673 (Cal. App. 1951); In re Foster, 287
P.2d 282 (Idaho 1955); Boltz v. Boltz, 325 Mass. 726, 92 N.E.2d 365 (1950);
Craddock's Case, 310 Mass. 116, 37 N.E.2d 508 (1941).
70. See Ferraro v. Ferraro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948).
71. Brown's Adm'r v. Brown, 308 Ky. 796, 215 S.W.2d 971 (1948); Franzen
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 130 N.J.L. 457, 33 A.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Shea v. Shea, 294 N.Y. 909, 63 N.E.2d 113 (1945).
It is reported in In re McKanna's Estate, 234 P.2d 673 (Cal. App. 1951), that
the Attorney General's Department of Texas ruled in 1946 "It can make no
difference where such act or acts of assumption or holding out take place."
Id. at 676.
72. Rittgers v. United States, 154 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1946); In re Foster, 287
P.2d 282 (Idaho 1955).
73. In the following cases, the various contacts with the state in which the
holding out occurred were or would have been considered sufficient. Tetterton
v. Arctic Tankers, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (visiting his relatives);
Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Tenn. 1949) (living for
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2. Status: Particular Vices
A. Fraud. In all of the recent cases concerning fraud in inducing the
marriage, at least one of the parties left the domicile and returned
to it. In one case, the court assumed that the particular fraud was
not a ground for annulment under the lex loci celebrationis but gave
a decree on its own law.74 In two others, the court refused a decree
on its own law, though the fraud was probably a sufficient ground
under the lex loci celebrationis.5 In the other two, one court refused
a decree because it would not have been granted under the other law,76
and one gave a decree, consulting only the lex Zoci celebrationis."7
Fraud in these marriage cases cannot properly be called a vice of
form: what is induced by the fraud is not an ordinary contract, but
consent to assuming a status in which the domiciliary state has an
overwhelming interest. If the domiciliary state regards the fraud as
a fatal vice, it should protect itself and its domiciliary from an un-
desirable union, no matter what the other law is. If the former re-
gards the fraud as not a sufficient vice, it sees no evil against which
it or its domiciliary needs protection. This is especially true where,
in the state to which the parties go for the ceremony, annulments are
very easy, while the domiciliary state deems only fraud going to the
"very essentials of the marriage relation" sufficient.78
B. Consent of Parents and Nonage. In none of the recent cases, in
all of which the parties promptly returned to their domicile, has lack
of consent of the parents or guardian been considered a sufficient
reason for declaring that an extra-state ceremony was ineffective, even
though the parties left their domicile for the purpose of avoiding its
requirement.79 The reasons have varied: courts have relied on the
several months); Stilley v. Stilley, 219 Ark. 813, 244 S.W.2d 958 (1952)
(living); Kennedy v. Damron, 268 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1954) (an established place
of abode); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 275 Ky. 559, 122 S.W.2d 137 (1938) (short
visit); Riddle v. Peters Trust Co., 147 Neb. 578, 24 N.W.2d 434 (1946)
(sojourning "they being of the theatrical profession"); Jordan v. Mohan, 15
N.J. Super. 513, 83 A.2d 614 (App. Div. 1951) (residence); In re Singer's
Estate, 138 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Surr. Ct. 1955) (honeymooning); Dibble v. Dibble,
88 Ohio App. 490, 100 N.E.2d 451 (1950) (the community in which they
reside); In re Warren, 40 Wash. 2d 342, 243 P.2d 632 (1952) (residence). But
sojourning was not enough where the original cohabitation was meretricious.
State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wash. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945).
74. Lederkremer v. Lederkremer, 173 Misc. 587, 18 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
75. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 85 A.2d 706 (Del. Super. 1951), afJ'd on
other grounds sub nom. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 90 A.2d 468 (Del. 1952); Levy
v. Levy, 309 Mass. 230, 34 N.E.2d 650 (1941).
76. McConnell v. McConnell, 99 F. Supp. 493 (D.D.C. 1951).
77. Damaskinos v. Damaskinos, 325 Mass. 217, 89 N.E.2d 766 (1950).
78. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, supra note 75.
79. An interesting, though doubtfully valid, reason for denying an annul-
ment appears in Carr v. Carr, 104 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (Sup. Ct. 1951), in which
the infant sought the annulment. Hinkley, Official Referee, said that, more-
over, the infant did not come into court with clean hands as he "deliber-
ately sought to and did circumvent the laws of this State."
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fact that statutes requiring consent are usually regarded as directory
only;80 on the existence at the domicile of a statute enacting the
"common law" rule of the conflict of laws;81 and on comparison of the
public policy involved in cases of other possible vices of substance.8
As in the "consent" cases, the parties to marriages attacked for the
possible vice of nonage all went from their domicile for the ceremony
and promptly returned. In all but two of the cases, the marriages were
held valid, the reasons given showing variations similar to those in the
"consent" cases.8 3 In New Hampshire it was held that the trial court
had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for annulment as such a marriage
might be repugnant to public policy. The emphasis was on the interest
in the status of the domicile, qua intended family domicile.M In Min-
nesota the court held that the marriage was voidable under its own
law and the other, as well; but actually applied its own law.85
Decisions holding that extra-state marriages of persons below the
ages permitted under the law of the intended family domicile are
not void may well reflect the policy stated in Boehm v. Rohlfs:
86
As was wisely said by the able trial court: "Because young people
sometimes indiscreetly get married before they reach the legal age, it is
not the policy of the law to impose upon them, and especially their in-
80. Castor v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
81. McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 58 P.2d 163 (1936); Cross v. Cross,
40 Mont. 300, 102 P.2d 829 (1940).
82. Hitchens v. Hitchens, 47 F. Supp. 73 (D.D.C. 1942); McDonald v. Mc-
Donald, supra note 81; Walker v. Walker,. 316 Ill. App. 251, 44 N.E.2d 937
(1942); Noble v. Noble, 299 Mich. 565, 300 N.W. 885 (1941); Carr v. Carr,
supra note 79. In the Hitchens and Noble (concurring opinion, 300 N.W. at
888) cases, the court intimated that the result would have been different if a
party had been under the District's statutory age of consent (18 for males,
16 for females). In McDonald, the court spoke of the absence of a statute "ex-
pressly and clearly regulating marriages abroad," giving the Uniform Mar-
riage Evasion Act as an example, and of "marriage . . . regarded as .odious
by the common consent of nations; e.g., where it is polygamous or incestuous
by the laws of nature." 58 P.2d at 164. In Carr, the contrast was with mar-
riages "contrary to the prohibitions of the natural law or the express pro-
visions of a statute." 104 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
83. In Payne v. Payne, 121 Colo. 212, 214 P.2d 495 (1950), the court quoted
Colorado's "common law rule" statute. In Boehm v. Rohlfs, 224 Iowa 226,
276 N.W. 105 (1937), such marriages were voidable and the Uniform Mar-
riage Evasion Act applies only to marriages which are void under the domicil-
iary law. In Mangrum v. Mangrum, 310 Ky. 226, 220 S.W.2d 406 (1949), the court
contrasted marriages of infants with bigamous and miscegenous marriages. In
Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618 (1945), the court quoted Pennegar
v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305 (1889), to the effect that the lex loci
celebrationis governs "matters of form, ceremony or qualification," and said
that nonage is question of the party being not "qualified." It is to be noted
that in Pennegar the marriage was void for remarriage with a paramour.
84. Sirois v. Sirois, 94 N.H. 215, 50 A.2d 88 (1946).
85. Von Felden v. Von Felden, 212 Minn. 212, 2 N.W.2d 426 (1942). A mar-
riage below age was voidable ab initio under the law of the place of ceremony
and voidable from the date of the decree under the Minnesota statute, STAT.
1927 § 8581, Mrxx. STAT. ANN. § 518.02 (1947): the latter type of decree was
ordered.
86. 224 Iowa 226, 276 N.W. 104, 108 (1937).
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nocent offspring, the distressing penalties that would result if the mar-
riage was held to be absolutely void, and it would be especially harsh and
unwarranted to so hold if neither of the young people asked to have the
marriage annulled after arriving at an age where either could have it
set aside."8 7
It is far from clear, however, that a state should apply its law of
marriage, making youthful marriage voidable, to an extra-state cere-
mony. This type of vice does not reach the dignity of making the
marriages odious to the people of the domicile. It seems that courts
should usually wait for some positive indication of legislative intent
that persons relying on the laws of the state for the creation of the
status should be unable to marry by an extra-state ceremony. Nor
should a court deem such a ceremony in any degree ineffective unless
both the laws of that state and its own make such marriage void or
voidable ab initio.
On the other hand, even though the law of the place of cere-
mony makes a particular infant marriage valid, the law of the
intended family domicile may well be applied to protect the state
and the infant party if its procedure, whether called annulment or
divorce, is such that the decree operates to dissolve the marriage only
from the date of decree, or if the annulment is in the discretion of the
court, or if the children born to a marriage which is voidable ab initio
can be deemed to be begotten or born in wedlock, 8 or if a statute
protects their legitimacy.
C. Remarriage after Divorce. Three types of statutes forbidding re-
marriage within a period after divorce must be considered: (1) those
which forbid or declare void the remarriage of the guilty party; (2)
those which forbid or declare void the remarriage of either party;
(3) those which purport to keep the marriage alive insofar as the
capacity to marry is concerned.89
The first type, containing unilateral prohibitions only, are uniformly
held to have no effect on extra-state ceremonies, 90 unless the prohibi-
87. It may be that a recognition of this policy motivated the decision in
Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618 (1945), wherein it was held that
cohabitation, after reaching lawful age under the lex loci celebrationis, outside
the place of ceremony and the domicile validated the marriage.
This somewhat startling, but highly sensible, notion that a state somehow
retains control of a marriage which was invalid under its laws, and can vali-
date it by matter ex post facto is also found in cases concerning marriages
which are bigamous because they were made too soon after divorce. In Abram-
son v. Abramson, 49 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1931), a curative statute, enacted
after the parties had changed domicile to another state, was held effective
in the latter. Accord: Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 29 A.2d 287 (1942);
Shippee v. Shippee, 95 N.H. 450, 66 A.2d 77 (1949).
88. See Sirois v. Sirois, 94 N.H. 215, 50 A.2d 88, 89 (1946).
89. Where the control of remarriage after divorce, is by way of decree nisi
or interlocutory, the marriage is not dissolved until the decree has become
inal by the lapse of time or by entry of a final decree.
90. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Wacht, 84 Ga. App. 602, 66 S.E.2d 757
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tion is of marriage to the paramour during the life of the innocent
spouse.91 The former are treated as statutes involving penalties which,
under the standard rule, do not have extra-territorial effect. Whether
this "penalty" analysis is correct or not, it is clear that such statutes
do not show a strong public policy.9 2
The statutes forbidding remarriage with the paramour are treated as
declaring a strong public policy and, therefore, invalidate marriages
in which the parties intend to and do return to the domicile after the
ceremony. The policy involved is probably two-fold. It may be di-
rected to protecting the first marriage by removing the temptation
to engage in adultery with the hope of marrying the paramour if
divorced for the adultery; or it may be directed to protecting others
from injury to the moral sense by their seeing the cohabitation of the
parties to the second marriage; or, obviously, it may be directed to
both. Whichever alternative is correct, it seems that the state which
should be protected is that of the domicile to which the parties return
to live and that, therefore, the law of no other intended family domicile
should regard such marriages as void.
Where bilateral prohibitions are involved, the "penalty" approach
is not followed: the question is-how strong a policy against "pro.
gressive polygamy" 93 is shown? Where the statute merely "forbids,"
"prohibits" or declares "unlawful" such remarriage, the policy is not
strong,94 and where such marriages are declared "void" there is a
difference of opinion.
In an earlier article,95 I stated the conclusions: that the word "void"
in the prohibitory statute shows a strong enough public policy to re-
quire the inference that it makes extra-state ceremonies ineffective
and, a fortiori, that the result should be the same where the prohibi-
tory period is coterminous with the period for appellate procedure in
the divorce suit. I see no reason to depart from either of these.
The word "void," when compared with those in such statutes of other
states, is a strong word.96 Moreover, grave problems are raised by
remarriages during the prohibitory period, and if that period is the
(1951); 'In re Palmer's Estate, 79 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Surr. Ct. 1948). Compare
Wagner v. Wagner, 58 Mont. Co. L.R. 18 (Pa. C.P. 1941), discussed note 15
supra.
91. 10 Mss. L.J. at 112-13.
92. Id. at 111-12.
93. See Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787, 789 (1908).
94. In re Winder's Estate, 219 P.2d 18 (Cal. App. 1950); In re Kinkead's
Estate, 239 inn. 27, 57 N.W.2d 628 (1953).
95. 10 Mss. L.J. at 113-18.
96. In Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939), the court held,
however, that such a marriage was not void. The court, knowing there was
no Idaho case in point, construed the Idaho statute in the light of its own
statute and cases. It is interesting to note that it misunderstood those cases
which, when the parties intended to return to Washington, held the marriages
void, but held them valid where there was no such intent.
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same as that for appellate procedure in the divorce suit, the provisions
should be treated as if they provided, in effect though not in terms,
for decrees nisi.
97
Where the statute in the divorcing state provides that the decree
does not "dissolve" the marriage, or "shall not effect the status" until
the end of the stated period, it should, a fortiori, be construed to give
to the decree of divorce the effect of a decree nisi. It should, therefore,
make no difference whether the party intended to return to the state in
which the decree was handed down or to leave there forever.
The question here is not one of giving extra-territorial effect to the
Wisconsin statute prohibiting another marriage within one year. The
controlling matter is whether or not the appellant was divorced from
her former husband at the time of her purported marriage to the respond-
ent ... and she was not then divorced from [him].98
D. Consanguinity. It is generally said, and undoubtedly accurately
where a British or an American state is concerned, that persons who
rely on the law of a state for the creation of the status do not succeed
in getting married by ceremonies in another state if their marriage
is incestuous by the common consent of Christian countries. This
common consent extends only to unions in the direct line of ascent
and descent or of brother and sister.99
Where more remote blood relationship or any connection by af-
finity is concerned, the question is whether the prohibitory statute
shows a public policy on the same level as that of the abhorrence of
marital unions which are incestuous by common consent.100
97. A Colorado statute provided that, during the period of one year in
which the divorce could be re-opened, "neither party thereto shall be permitted
to marry any other person." This was held not to have been intended to have
any extra-territorial effect as the Colorado court had held that this statute did
not suspend the finality of the decree of divorce. In re Winder's Estate, 219
P.2d 18 (Cal. App. 1950).
98. See Means v. Means, 40 Cal. App. 2d 569, 104 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1940)
(the divorce was decreed in Washington, the party moved to California and
went to Arizona for the ceremony); Accord: Ex parte Soucek, 101 F.2d 405
(7th Cir. 1939); Henderson v. Henderson, 199 Md. 449, 87 A.2d 403 (1952)
(applying Virginia code). Contra: King v. Klemp, 26 N.J. Misc. 140, 57 A.2d
530 (Ch. 1947); In re Peart's Estate, 277 App. Div. 61, 97 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1st
Dep't 1950). In King, the divorce was decreed in Kansas and the party re-
married in New York. The New Jersey court said that the Kansas court had
held that decrees under the statute were final, and held that it merely stated
a Kansas policy which would not be given extra-territorial effect by New
York courts. In Peart, the court held that language of the Virginia court in
Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316 (1923), to the effect that the
marriage was not dissolved until the end of the period, was dictum; and
held that the Virginia decree was final. Two out of five judges dissented, 97
N.Y.S.2d at 889-90, on grounds similar to those stated in the quotation from
the Means case, supra.
99. See Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 463 (1873); STORY, CONFLICT
or LAWS § 104 (2d ed. 1841).
100. It is difficult to determine why some states abhor some of these mar-
riages. The Wisconsin statute, Wis. STAT. § 245.03(1) (1953), makes it appear
that the prohibition is based on an idea of eugenics: first cousins may marry
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Only one of the 48 states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, or Hawaii,
permits the marriage, within its borders, of uncle and niece or aunt
and nephew. 101 The statutes of 22 of these declare such marriages
"incestuous" and those of 13 others declare them "void." The others
"prohibit" them, or declare them "unlawful," or provide that such
persons are "incapable of contracting marriage," or "shall not marry."
On the other hand, only 25 states forbid the intermarriage of first
cousins, 8 'declaring them incestuous and 7 declaring them void.
The unanimous disapproval of marriages of uncle-niece and aunt-
nephew marriages plus the strong language used in 42102 states with
respect to them, seems to put such marriages on the level of incest by
the common consent of American states if they are declared "incestu-
ous" or "void" by the statutes and extra-state ceremonies should be
held to be ineffective. 10 3 Where marriages of first cousins are con-
cerned, however, the disapproval is far from unanimous and only 15
states use any strong word. It seems, therefore, that extra-state cere-
monies should be effective only if such marriages are declared "in-
cestuous" by the statutes.1°4
E. Miscegenation. The public policy against miscegenation is sectional
and, except in the southern states, is not strong and even shows some
tendency toward weakening. Its sectional nature is clear from the
distribution of the prohibitory statutes, almost all of which are found
in states below the Mason and Dixon line and in those west of the
if the woman is 50 years old. In many of them, however, no distinction is
made between consanguinity and affinity.
101. The Rhode Island statute declares the intermarriage of uncle-niece and
aunt-nephew to be "null and void," but permits marriages of Jews within the
degrees allowed by their religion. R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 415, §§ 1-4 (1938).
102. This total is made up of those whose statutes contain the words "inces-
tuous" or "void" or both, plus those which use less strong language in the
marriage statutes but set criminal penalties for sexual intercourse or inter-
marriage between persons so related.
103. Osoinach v. Watkins, 235 Ala. 564, 180 So. 577 (1938); Sclamberg v.
Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942). In both of these cases the
word "incestuous" or "void" was in the marriage statutes and the criminal
statutes applied to sexual intercourse.
Compare Campione v. Campione, 201 Misc. 590, 107 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct.
1951), with In re May's Estate, 280 App. Div. 647, 117 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 -(3d
Dep't 1952). The New York statute declares such marriages "incestuous and
void" and penal statutes impose penalties therefor. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 5.
The parties in May were Jews who left New York to marry in Rhode Island.
The court said that such marriages were not "repugnant to our concept of
natural law," calling to witness the fact that they were lawful in the state
until 1893 and are still lawful under Levitical or Talmudic law. Desmond, J.,
dissented, substantially on the grounds stated in the text of this article. He
said that New York had declared such marriages "incestuous, void and crim-
inal," and that "we, by this decision, are denying it [the statute] its efficacy."
104. In my discussion of uncle-niece and aunt-nephew marriages, I did not
intend to emphasize the use of the word "void" in a statute. My conclusion
is based on cumulation of the indicia of public policy. In first cousin situation,
however, there seems to be no sufficient cumulation of such indicia, nor even
a sufficient number of states which use strong words.
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Mississippi River.105 This has also been recognized in the cases. 105
That it is weakening is shown by Perez v. LippoZd,107 which held the
miscegenation statute of California unconstitutional, and by the repeal
of such statutes in Montana.
108
The emphasis in the cases has never been on the wording of the
prohibitory statutes, though almost all of them contain sufficiently
strong language to justify decisions that they were intended to apply
to extra-state ceremonies. 109 All of the recent cases, except one,11 0
have held such ceremonies ineffective:"' all of them concerned domi-
,iliaries who left the state for a ceremony and returned to live in the
state.
It is possible that conflict of laws problems in this field will be
solved by a United States Supreme Court decision in accord with Perez
v. Lippold 12 but until that happens it must be recognized that in many
states the public policy against miscegenation is a very strong one, and
105. But see IiD. ANN. STAT. §§ 44-104, 44-105 (Burns 1952).
106. See State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 246 (1877), in which there was express
recognition of the sectional nature of the policy; and Pennegar v. State, 87
Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305, 307-08 (1889), in which the court distinguished be-
tween an earlier Tennessee case and Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 153
(1819), on the ground that the Tennessee prohibition represented a strong
public policy, while that of Massachusetts represented only ideas of political
expediency.
107. 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), wherein it was said that the statute
was "rot designed to meet a clear and present peril arising out of an emer-
gency."
108. MONT. STATS. 1953, c. 4, § 1.
109. Almost all of the statutes declare such marriages "Void"; a few states
have constitutional prohibition; some add, and some have only criminal
statutes applicable to such marriages. The exceptions are Indiana, IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 44-105 (Bums 1952), and Wyoming, Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-108
(1945), (in both of which the statutes refer to marriages contracted in the
state), and Colorado, infra note 110.
110. Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240
(1942). The statute, COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 107, § 2 (1935), declared the marriages
of white and negroes or mulattoes "absolutely void. . . .provided that this
section shall not be construed to prevent people from living in that portion
of the state acquired from Mexico from marrying according to the custom
of that country." Bock, J., dissented on the ground that this couple was not
from that part of the state.
It is difficult to understand how miscegenous marriages can be odious in
Colorado if people who live in one part of the state can contract such mar-
riages, even within the state.
111. Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944); Miller v.
Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948) (semble); In re Shun J. Takahashi's
Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942) (for the present law of Montana, see
text at note 108, supra); Baker v. Carter, 180 Okla. 71, 68 P.2d 85 (1937); Naim
v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955). In In re Monk's Estate, 48 Cal. App.
2d 209, 120 P.2d 167 (1941), the marriage of California domiciliaries in Arizona
was held void under the statute of the latter state.
112. The commentators are not in agreement with respect to the supportable
bases for the decision in Perez. See, e.g., Notes: 17 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 262
(1949); 1 STAN. L. REV. 289 (1949); 58 YALE L.J. 472 (1949). In Naim v. Naim,
supra note 111, the Virginia court cited cases in the following states holding
miscegenation statutes constitutional: Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Missouri,
Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and pointed out that in
Perez, the only divergent case, there was a 4-3 decision.
[ VOL. 9
MARRIAGE IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
that those states will continue to refuse to create the status for those
persons who look to them for its creation, no matter where the
ceremony takes place.
1 3
F. Evasion of State Laws. The problems raised by atfempts to get
married in spite of various prohibitions of marriage have been solved
in most cases by consideration of the strength of the public policy in-
volved in the prohibition. In a considerable number of cases, however,
the court has spoken of the intention with which the parties went out
of the state for their marriage ceremony. Some of the courts have
spoken of the subjective intention of the parties to evade the law, a
state of mind including knowledge of the prohibition and an intention
to marry in spite of it. Other courts have confined themselves to a
search for an objective intention, a state of mind directed to return-
ing to and living in the state.
In those cases in which the subjective intention to evade was held
to be material, the marriage violated some strong public policy of
the state." 4 In those in which it was held to be immaterial, the policy
was not strong." 5
The first section of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act" 6 provides in
effect that any person who resides in the state, and intends to con-
tinue to reside11 7 there, cannot contract a valid marriage by an extra-
state ceremony if the marriage would have been void had it been
entered into in the state. The substance of this section has been en-
acted in eleven states," 8 the substance of the entire Act in five
113. In Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), the court said that
holding miscegenous marriages void was the only way of maintaining the
non-mongrel blood of the state's citizens. The existence of an "evasion"
statute specifically applying to miscegenous marriages, VA. CODE ANNx. §§ 20-58
(1950), strengthens the indicia of public policy.
114. Miscegenation: Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 123 (10th Cir.
1944); Brand v. State, 242 Ala. 15, 6 So. 2d 446, 448 (1941); Succession of
Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907) (remarriage with paramour); In re
Shun J. Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217, 220 (1942); In re
Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. St. 625, 39 Atl. 16 (1898).
115. Health certificate condition precedent to license: In re Perez' Estate,
98 Cal. App. 2d 121, 219 P.2d 35 (1950). Consent of parents: Noble v. Noble,
299 Mich. 565, 300 N.W. 885 (1941); Carr v. Carr, 104 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct.
1951). Nonage: Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618 (1945). Uni-
lateral prohibition of remarriage after divorce: Shea v. Shea, 268 App.
Div. 677, 52 N.Y.S.2d 756, 763 (2d Dep't 1945) [in the dissenting opinion of
Johnston, J., adopted in the reversing judgment, 294 N.Y. 909, 63 N.E.2d 113
(1945) ] In re Kogan's Estate, 203 Misc. 739, 118 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
116. This Act was withdrawn from the list of approved Uniform Acts in
1943. It was first approved in 1912, at which time many states had some form
of "evasion" statute and was enacted in "full or in substance," in only five
states between 1912 and 1915. "The Uniform Act can be effective only if it
has widespread adoption; otherwise it merely tends to confuse the law." See
[1943] HANDBOOK NATL'. CoNr. COMM'N UmIom STATE LAWS 64.
117. A person resides and intends to continue to reside in the state if he
is and intends to continue there domiciled. Sweeney v. Kennard, 331 Mass.
542, 120 N.E.2d 910 (1954). There is no "evasion" if the intention is to abandon
the domicile in the state; the acquisition of a new domicile is not required.
118. Some of these statutes are confined to particular types of marriages,
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others.119 The effect of these statutes is to put some types of prohib-
ited marriages on the same level as polygamy and incest by the
common consent of Christian countries.
120
It is improper for a court, unless compelled by an express statute,
to give any effect to a subjective intention to avoid the application of
a statute forbidding a particular kind of marriage.121 Intention to
evade may be material in a prosecution for marrying outside the
state in violation of a statute, but is immaterial to a decision that the
marriage is valid or void. A miscegenous, incestuous or progressively
polygamous marriage is odious or not, depending on the strength of
public policy. It is no less odious because the parties did not know
of the prohibition and did not leave the state for their ceremony in
order to get out from under the prohibition. A marriage which, with-
out the intention to evade, is not sufficiently against public policy to
demand a declaration of its nullity does not become more odious if it
is entered into with the intention of avoiding the prohibition.
Finally, it is impossible to "evade" any law. One can avoid the ap-
,plication of one rule of law by invoking another, but he cannot evade
the first.
We do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, a
case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the
worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law
permits. When an act is condemned as an evasion what is meant is that
it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the
mere letter of the law.122
e.g., miscegenous; some of them speak of an "intention to evade" the laws of
the state, but most enact an objective test for evasion-the intention to return.
119. It may be that the failure to enact the substance of the entire act is due
to the content of the second section, which makes void any marriages in the
state if they would have been void if contracted in the state where the
party resides and intends to continue to reside. It has been applied in only
a few cases, all involving New York's unilateral prohibition of the remarriage
of the guilty party to a divorce for adultery. There are four of these cases,
of which Canwright v. Canwright, 273 App. Div. 184, 76 N.Y.S.2d 10 (3d Dep't
1947), is the most recent. See also, note 15, supra. This gives New York a pro-
tection which she does not demand by her own conflict of laws rule.
120. E.g., unilateral prohibition of remarriage after divorce: Sweeney v.
Kennard, 331 Mass. 542, 120 N.E.2d 910 (1954). But the Evasion Act is a
declaration of policy only. When combined with the unilateral prohibition
of remarriage it does not give the divorce decree the effect of a decree nisi and
make extra-state ceremonies ineffective, if the parties do not intend to return
to the State: see Sweeney v. Kennard, supra note 117; Vital v. Vital, 319 Mass.
185, 65 N.E.2d 205 (1946).
121. The earlier Massachusetts opinions read into the first section of the
Uniform Act a requirement of subjective intention to evade the marriage law.
See, e.g., Atwood v. Atwood, 297 Mass. 229, 8 N.E.2d 916 (1937). But the later
opinions have considered only the intention to return and reside in the state.
See, e.g., Levanosky v. Levanosky, 311 Mass. 638, 42 N.E.2d 561 (1942).
122. Mr. Justice Holmes in Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630 (1916).
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III. CONCLUSION
The laws concerning marriage are made up of two parts: the sub-
stantive part, that regulating the creation of the status; and the cere-
monial part, that regulating the exchange of consents. It seems odd
that any state should be unwilling to allow persons of whose union it
disapproves and who rely on it for the creation of the status to get
married by using its ceremonial part in conjunction with the other
[intra-state ceremony ineffective], but be willing to allow persons of
the same kind to get married by using its substantive part in con-
junction with another state's ceremonial part [extra-state ceremony
effective].
To say that the Legislature intended such a law to apply only while
the parties are within the boundaries of the state, and that it con-
templated that by crossing the state line its citizens could successfully
nullify is terms, is to make the act essentially useless and impotent, and
ascribe practical imbecility to the lawmaking power.123
This was said of a bilateral prohibition of remarriage within a period
after divorce, but it seems to apply equally cogently to any prohibi-
tion of marriage which would have the effect of making an intra-state
ceremony ineffective. Yet, as we know, courts have found two cate-
gories of undesirable marriages-those which are void if celebrated
in the state, and those which are void no matter where celebrated if
the parties have and intend to retain their domiciles therein. De-
cisions recognizing the validity of extra-state marriages of the first
type seem to reflect judicial deprecation of the policy shown by the
prohibitory statute. To attempt to justify the decisions by reliance on
the public policy in favor of upholding attempted marriages if that
is reasonably possible, is in vain. The legislature has declared this
marriage so undesirable that it cannot be contracted in the state.
If, however, it can be inferred that legislators know the great
common-law conflict of laws rule-marriages valid where celebrated
are everywhere valid... -it can also be inferred that the law-makers
intended that the prohibition of a marriage was not to have extra-
territorial effect, unless they enact a statute expressly referring to
extra-state ceremonies. This argument is, of course, strengthened by
the failure of a legislature to enact such a statute after the courts of
the state have held that a foreign ceremony was effective in the case
of certain types of persons, e.g., first cousins. The argument is even
better if the state's "evasion" statute applies expressly to one or more
types of marital unions, miscegenous for example, but does not apply
to others.
The public policy to be consulted in all cases concerning the validity
123. See Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787, 789.
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of a marriage is that of the intended family domicile, not that of the
domicile of either or both parties at the time of the ceremony, nor,
a fortiori, that of the forum as such nor as the state in which an in-
cident is claimed.
It seems, therefore, that here is a situation in which the renvoi,
in the English sense, should be applied in a proper case. If there
comes before a court of state F a case in which the ceremony took
place in A and the law of B governed the creation of the status, F's
court should not look to the law of A, because of F's stated conflict of
laws rule, but should look to that of B to discover whether it would
apply its own marriage law or that of A.
A marriage should be valid or void in all states, not valid in some
and void in others.
